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1.  Introduction   
 
Concerning the provision of public goods and services, an important distinction is between 
public production and public finance. In the former case, the goods are produced by the 
government itself. In particular, the government hires public employees and purchases final 
goods from the private sector to produce public goods and services. In the latter case, public 
goods and services are produced by private firms, the so-called private providers, with the 
government financing the cost of production of an agreed-upon quantity. Examples of goods 
and services that can belong to either category include public hospitals, public television and 
radio, public schools, environmental protection, services provided by local authorities, etc.      
The issue of public goods provision has attracted increasing interest in both academic 
and policy circles. In academia, production and finance are two distinct ways of public goods 
provision. For instance, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 482) emphasize that “the two are 
often confused, though both logically and in practice they are distinct”.
1 In policy, there is a 
big debate nowadays on the role of the state and, in particular, the idea of opening up public 
services to new providers. In the UK, for instance, reforms are designed to encourage “any 
qualified provider of public goods” (The Observer, 22.05.2011, p. 7) and “across much of 
the public sector, from health and education to local authorities and prisoner rehabilitation, 
the provision of public services is increasingly being contracted out to private suppliers” 
(The Economist, January 22
nd, 2011, p. 41). But, at the same time, the British Deputy PM, 
Nick Clegg, questions private sector involvement saying that the real issue is about 
“diversifying providers” and that this does not extend to a belief “that private providers are 
inherently better than public-sector providers” (The Guardian, 10 February 2011, p. 15).  
What are the implications of switching from public production to public finance? Can 
public providers beat private providers? Is this switch good for the general interest and bad 
for public employees? If yes, is there a mix of reforms that can be good for both private and 
public employees?   
The present paper tries to answer these questions. To the best of our knowledge, so 
far there has not been an attempt to study, and quantify, the differences between public 
production and public finance in a dynamic general equilibrium setup. We fill this gap by 
studying issues of both efficiency and redistribution, where efficiency has to do with per 
                                                           
1 There is a rich taxonomy of public goods and services depending on the way of provision, financing and 
distribution. See e.g. Cullis and  Jones (1998, chapter 5).    2
capita output and welfare, while redistribution refers to differences in income and welfare 
between private and public employees.  
We build upon the neoclassical growth model. We first model the case of public 
production. Following e.g. Finn (1988), Ardagna (2007) and Pappa (2009), there are two 
distinct groups of households: those that work in the private sector and those that are 
employed in the public sector. The latter (called public employees), together with goods 
purchased from the private sector, are used as inputs in the government production function. 
Calibrating the model to match tax-spending data in the UK economy over 1990-2010, we 
solve it and specify, among other variables, the time-path of public goods as induced by the 
existing tax-spending policy mix. Then, using this status quo solution as a point of reference, 
we study what would change if, other things equal, the same time-path of public goods is 
produced by private firms, the so-called private providers. These firms produce the amount 
of public goods ordered by the government by solving a cost-minimization problem with the 
government financing their total cost.
2 We also study the case in which the same amount of 
public goods continues to be produced by the public sector but now, again other things 
equal, public firms minimize their costs like their private counterparts do in the case of 
public finance. These three model economies (namely, the status quo one, the one with cost-
minimizing private providers and the one with cost-minimizing public providers) are directly 
comparable. In all experiments, the amount of public goods produced, and the number of 
households employed in the production of public goods, remain the same across regimes.   
There are four main results. First, the switch from the status quo economy to an 
economy with cost-minimizing private providers increases per capita welfare at the cost of 
making public employees worse off. The latter happens because the wages of those involved 
in the production of public goods falls when it is private providers that supply these goods. 
Second, the effect of this switch on per capita output depends on the method of public 
financing. When the efficiency savings enjoyed by the government, coming from a more 
efficient way of delivering the public good, are translated into reductions in distorting taxes, 
then per capita output also rises. Actually, in our experiments, when the government uses the 
efficiency savings to cut labour taxes, output rises substantially. Third, when we assume that 
public providers choose inputs in a cost-minimizing way, the solution is very similar to the 
status quo case where the associated variables are exogenously set at their data averages. 
                                                           
2 As the British Deputy PM, Nick Clegg, has said “there will be no for profit-providers in our publicly funded 
… system” (The Guardian, 10 February, 2011, p. 5).    3
This could mean that in the UK, over 1990-2010, the public sector has exhausted its role in 
terms of aggregate efficiency as a provider of public goods and services. Fourth, since there 
are aggregate efficiency gains from switching to private providers, we show that the society 
can design a simple redistributive scheme that makes everybody better off, including those 
previously employed in the public sector.  
We wish to clarify two things at the outset. First, we focus on polar cases. In the 
status quo economy, we assume that there is public production only. But we are aware that 
actually some public services have been contracted out to private suppliers already. By 
contrast, in the reformed economy, we assume that there are private providers only with the 
government just financing their costs. But we are aware that some public production is 
always desirable (e.g. police and courts). In any case, our main results are not expected to be 
affected by the presence, or not, of such public goods; one could take them as given, and 
then compare public production versus public finance of the remaining public goods. 
Second, here we do not take a stance on the optimal amount of public goods. We just take 
the size/mix of public spending, the share of public employment and tax rates as in the data 
and compute the induced amount of public goods by using a relatively standard dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model. In turn, we ask what would have happened in the case 
in which the same amount of public goods, socially optimal or not, was supplied by cost-
minimizing firms.
3   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 models the case of public 
production. Section 3 models the case of public finance. Their comparison is in Section 4. 
Section 5 asks whether public providers can beat private providers. Section 6 looks for 
Pareto improving policies. Section 7 closes the paper.    
  
2.  An economy with public production of public goods  
 
We build on the neoclassical growth model. Consider a two-sector general equilibrium 
model in which private firms choose capital and labor supplied by private employees to 
produce a private good, while the government purchases part of the private good and hires 
public employees to produce a public good. The latter provides utility-enhancing services to 
all households. The private good is converted into the public good by a production function 
                                                           
3 This is consistent with the Mirrlees Review in the UK (Mirrlees et al 2010, 2011) that also takes public 
spending as given and looks at the efficiency of the tax system. Here, we look at the efficiency of the system of 
public goods provision.    4
so that each can be expressed in the same units. Throughout the paper, we assume away user 
charges for the public good. To finance total public spending, including the cost of the public 
good, the government levies distorting taxes and issues bonds.  
There are four agents in the economy: households that work in the private sector 
(called private employees), households that work in the public sector (called public 
employees), private firms that produce a private good and the government. All households 
can participate in capital and bond markets. Our model in this section is similar to that used 
by most of the related literature (see e.g. Finn, 1998, Cavallo, 2005, Ardagna, 2007, Pappa, 
2009, Linnemann, 2009, Forni et al, 2009, and Fernández-de-Córdoba, 2010), in the sense 
that the roles of private and public employees are distinct, there is no labor mobility between 
the private and public sector and economic policy is exogenous.
4      
Concerning population sizes, there are  1,2,...,
p
t p N =  identical households that work 
in the private sector and  1,2,...,
b
t bN =  identical households that work in the public sector, 
where 
bp
tt t NN N +=  at each t. There are also  1,2,...,
f
t f N =  identical private firms. The 
number of private firms equals the number of households that work in the private sector, 
f p
tt NN = , or equivalently each household employed in the private sector owns one private 
firm. We assume that population sizes  t N , 
b







ν ≡  is exogenous (this is defined below).        
 
2.1 Households that work in the private sector 
The expected lifetime utility of each household  1,2,...,
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4 Fernández-de-Córdoba et al (2010) provide a survey of this literature. On the other hand, see Quadrini and 
Trigari (2008) for job search and matching mechanisms.     5
where 
p
t C  and 
p
t e  are respectively  p ’s private consumption and hours worked, 
g
t Y  is per 
capita public goods and services,
5  0 E  is an expectations operator and 01 β <<  is a time 
preference parameter.  
The period utility function is (see also e.g. Fernández-Villaverde, 2010): 
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where ψ ,  µ  and  0 ξ >  are standard preference parameters. Thus, 
pg
tt CY ψ +  is composite 
consumption and public services influence private utility through the parameter ψ  (see e.g. 
Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992).  
Each household  p  enters period t with predetermined holdings of physical capital 
and government bonds, 
p
t K  and 
p
t B , whose returns are  t r  and  t ρ  respectively. The within-
period budget constraint of each  p  is:  
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t I  is savings in the form of capital, 
p
t D  is savings in the form of government bonds, 
p
t π  
is dividends received from private firms,
6 
p
t w  is the wage rate in the private sector, 
, tr p
t G  is 
government transfers to each  p , 0
k




t τ <  are tax rates on capital income, labor 
income and consumption respectively, and 01
k δ < <  is the capital depreciation rate.  









≡ .   
6 We assume that only private employees receive dividends from private firms (see (3a) and (6a) below). This 
is unimportant because, for simplicity, there are no profits in equilibrium. This is throughout the paper.    6
Each  p  chooses  11 0 {, , ,}
pp pp
tt tt t CK B e
∞
++ =  taking prices and policy as given. The standard 
first-order conditions are written in Appendix A.   
 
2.2 Households that work in the public sector (public employees) 
Public employees are modeled similarly to private employees. Thus, the expected lifetime 
utility of each  1,2,...,
b
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The within-period budget constraint of each b  is:  
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and 
g
t w  is the wage rate in the public sector and 
, tr b
t G  is government transfers to each b .  
Each  b  chooses  11 0 {, , ,}
bb bb
tt tt t CK B e
∞
+ +=  taking prices and policy as given. The first-
order conditions are as in Appendix A if we replace superscript  p  with superscript b .   
 
2.3 Firms in the private sector  
In each period, each private firm  1,2,...,
f
t f N =  chooses capital and labor inputs, 
f
t K  and 
f
t e , to maximize profits given by:      7
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t Y , is produced by a CRS Cobb-Douglas function: 
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where 01 α <<  is a parameter and  t A  is total factor productivity (this is defined below).   
Each  f  chooses 
f
t K  and 
f
t e  taking prices as given. The standard first-order 
conditions of this static problem are written in Appendix B.  
 
2.4 Government budget constraint  
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t G  is total public spending on goods and services purchased from the private sector, 
w
t G  is total public wage payments, 
, tr p
t G  is transfers to all households working in the private 
sector, 
, tr b
t G  is transfers to all public employees,
7  t B  is the beginning-of-period total stock of 
government bonds, and  t T  denotes total tax revenues, where: 
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Thus, in each period, there are nine policy instruments (
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t τ , ,
l
t τ 1 ,
b
tt NB + ) out of which only eight can be set independently, with the ninth 
following residually to satisfy the government budget constraint. Following most of the 
related literature, we will start by assuming that the adjusting policy instrument is the end-of-
period public debt,  1 t B + , so that the other eight policy instruments can follow exogenous   8
processes (defined below). For convenience, concerning spending policy instruments, we 




































≡ , where 
t Y  denotes total output (
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2.5 Public sector production function 
Following the related literature mentioned above, we assume that public goods and services, 
g
t Y , are produced by using goods purchased from the private sector, 
g
t G , and public 
employment, 
g
t L , where 
g bb
tt t LN e = . In particular, following e.g. Linnemann (2009), we use a 
CRS Cobb-Douglas production function of the form: 
 
1 () ( )
gg g
tt tt YA GL
θ θ − =                                                                                                              (10) 
 
where 01 θ ≤≤  is a parameter. Note that the TFP is the same as in the private sector (see (8) 
above). This is because we do not want our results to be driven by exogenous factors.  
 
2.6 Decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE) with public production  
We can now solve for a DCE in which (i) all households maximize utility, (ii) all firms in the 
private sector maximize profits, (iii) all markets clear (see Appendix C for market-clearing 
conditions) and all constraints are satisfied. The DCE consists of the following eleven 
equations:
8 
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We therefore have eleven equations in eleven variables, 
11 1 1 0 { , ,,,,, , , , , }
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∞
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= , and total factor productivity,  0 {} tt A
∞
= . We assume that the 
eight exogenous policy instruments are constant and set at their data average values (see 
below), while  0 {} tt A
∞
=  follows a standard stochastic AR(1) process with an autoregressive 
parameter  01
a ρ <<  and standard deviation 
a σ  (see below). These equilibrium equations   10
are log-linearized around the long run. This model serves as a benchmark and is solved 
numerically in section 4.
10   
 
3.  The same economy with private providers of public goods 
 
We now study what changes when, other things equal, the same amount of public goods, as 
found by the above solution, is produced by private firms, the so-called private providers of 
public services, in each time period. These private providers choose capital and labor inputs 
to produce the amount of public goods ordered by the government by solving a cost 
minimization problem with the government financing their total cost. Thus, now the 
government is not involved in any production itself.  
The optimization problem of households  1,2,...,
p
t p N = , which work at the private 
firms producing the private good, as well as the optimization problem of households 
1,2,...,
b
t bN = , which work at the private firms producing the public good ordered by the 
government, remain as before (see equations (1)-(3) and (4)-(6) respectively). The same 
applies to the problem of private firms  1,2,...,
p f N =  producing the private good (see 
equations (7)-(8)). What changes is the introduction of private firms producing the public 
good, indexed by  1,2,...,
b
t gN = ,
11 and the new role of the government. In particular, each 
private provider g  produces a given amount of the public good ordered by the government, 
/
g b




=   denotes the 
sequence of the total amount of public goods as found by the solution of (11a-k) in the 




=   are taken as given in this new regime. 
Also notice that now both groups of firms,  f  and  g , participate in factor markets (see the 
market-clearing conditions below). The government makes lump-sum transfers as before and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
9 Equations (12a-b) follow from the optimality conditions of the private firm and the related market-clearing 
conditions, while equation (12c) follows from the policy rule 
wg gg b b
w tt t t t
t p f
tt t
Gw Lw N e
s
YYN Y
≡= = .  
10 Notice that the equilibrium equations are in terms of individual variables directly (i.e. private and public 
employees) without using any aggregation results (see also Garcia-Milà et al, 2010). Also recall that, with 
perfect capital markets and common discount factors, the allocation of the aggregate stock of capital and bonds 
to the two types of individuals cannot be pinned down by the equilibrium conditions (see below for details and 
related papers). 
11 We assume that the number of private firms producing the public good equals the number of households 
working in these firms, and we continue to assume that the number of private firms producing the private good 
equals the numbers of households working in these firms. All this is analogous to section 2.     11
finances the total cost of private providers (the latter replaces spending on public wages and 
goods purchased from the private sector).            
In what follows, we model what changes relative to section 2.     
 
3.1 Private firms that produce a given amount of the public good (private providers) 
In each period, each private provider  1,2,...,
b
t gN =  chooses capital and labor inputs, 
g
t K  
and 
g
t e , to minimize costs. The cost-minimization problem is:   
 
g
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where  t r  is the rental cost of capital as defined above, 
g
t w  is the new wage rate received by 
households employed by private providers,
12  t ξ  is a multiplier measuring the marginal cost 
of production, 
g
t Y   is the total amount of public goods which is exogenously given by the 
previous problem, and 
g
t Y  is the private provider’s output which is produced by using the 
same production function as in (8) above: 
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12 The determination of 
g
t w  is different from section 2. In section 2, 
g
t w  was basically determined by policy 
(see (12c) above), while now it is determined by standard labor market forces. See also below.    12
where Appendix D provides details based on Mas-Colell et al (1995, pp. 139-143). As said, 
the determination of 
g
t w  is different from section 2. In particular, while it was determined by 
the policy rule for the share of public wages in section 2, now it is market determined.    
 
3.2 Government budget constraint   
The within-period budget constraint of the government changes from (9a) to: 
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where the first term on the left-hand side is the total cost of public goods produced by private 
firms and the other variables are as defined above.  
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before, we will start by assuming that the residually determined policy instrument is the end-
of-period public debt,  1 t B + . As said, the level of public goods, 
g
t Y  , is now treated as a policy 
instrument and, at each t, is set at the value found in section 2 above. By contrast, in section 
2, 
g
t s  and 
w
t s  were policy instruments, while 
g
t Y   was an endogenous variable.  
 
3.3 Decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE) with cost-minimizing private providers  
We solve for a DCE in which (i) all households maximize utility, (ii) all private firms that 
produce the private good maximize profits and all private firms that produce the public good 
minimize costs, (iii) all markets clear (see Appendix E for the new market-clearing 
conditions) and all constraints are satisfied. The new DCE consists of the following eleven 
equations: 
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Therefore, in this new system, we have eleven equations in eleven variables, 
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is set as found in the previous regime, while the other six exogenous policy instruments are 
assumed to be constant and set at their data average values (see below). Total factor 
productivity,  0 {} tt A
∞
= , follows the same AR(1) process as above. These new equilibrium   14
equations are log-linearized around the new long run. The model is solved numerically in 
section 4 below.    
 
4. Numerical solutions and comparison of the two model economies  
 
We now solve and compare the above two model economies.    
 
4.1 How we work 
We work in two steps. We first solve the model in section 2, when this model is calibrated to 
match some stylized facts, and in particular the tax-spending policy mix, of the UK economy 
over 1990-2010. This solution will give us, among other things, the time path of public 
goods induced by the existing UK tax-spending policy mix. This status quo economy will 
then be used as a point of reference for evaluating policy reforms. In particular, in the second 
step, using the same parameterization, we solve the model economy in section 3, where it is 
private providers, rather than the government itself, that produce the same time path of 
public goods. We will compare the status quo economy to the reformed economy both in the 
long run and in the transition path. The way we work follows most of the literature on policy 
reforms (see e.g. Lucas, 1990, who compares the macroeconomic allocation implied by the 
existing US tax mix to that under optimal Ramsey policy according to which the capital tax 
rate is set to be zero).  
 
4.2 Parameter values and policy variables used in the solution   
Table 1 reports the baseline parameter values for technology and preference, as well as the 
values of exogenous policy variables, used to solve the status quo model economy in section 
2. The time unit is meant to be a year.  
Our parameterization is standard with most parameter values for technology and 
preference being borrowed from Angelopoulos et al (2011) who have recently calibrated an 
aggregate DSGE model to annual data for the UK economy. When we have no a priori 
information about a technology or preference parameter value, or when different authors use 
different values, we will consider a range of values. In general, we can report that all main 
results are robust to parameter values.  
Public spending and tax rate values are those of sample averages of the UK economy 
over 1990-2010. The data are obtained from OECD, Economic Outlook, no. 88. We report   15
that our main results do not change when we consider alternative time periods, e.g. 1970-
2010 or 1996-2010.  
 
Table 1 around here 
(parameter values and policy variables) 
  
Let us discuss, briefly, the values summarized in Table 1. The labour share in the 
private production function, 1 α − , is set at 0.601, which is the value in Angelopoulos et al. 
(2011). The long-run scale parameter in the technology function,  A, is set at 1. The time 
preference rate is set at 0.99. The weight given to public goods and services in composite 
consumption, ψ , is set at 0.1, as is usually the case in similar studies. The other preference 
parameters related to hours worked, µ  and ξ , are set at 5 and 1 respectively; these 
parameter values jointly imply hours worked within usual ranges. The capital depreciation 
rate is set at  0.05 δ = .  
  In the baseline calibration, the productivity of public employment, vis-à-vis the 
productivity of goods purchased from the private sector, in the public sector production 
function, 1 θ − , is set at 0.493. This value is the sample average of public wage payments, as 
share of total public spending on inputs used in the production of public goods (see also e.g. 
Linnemann, 2009, for similar practice). But we will also experiment with other values of 
1 θ − .      
Public employees as a share of total population, 
b ν , are 0.1904 in the data. Public 
spending on wage payments and transfers, as shares of output, are respectively  0.109
w
t s =  
and 0.2199
tr
t s =  in the data. We then assume that total transfers are allocated to private and 
public employees according to their shares in population,  0.1904
b ν =  and  1 0.1904
p ν =−  
(see below for other cases considered). The output share of public spending on goods and 
services purchased from the private sector, 
g
t s , is then calculated residually from total public 
spending minus spending on public wage payments, transfers and interest payments; this is 
found to be 0.1119 in the data. The effective tax rates on consumption, capital and labor are 
respectively  0.1852
c τ = ,  0.3875
k τ =  and  0.2685
l τ =  over 1990-2008; the data are taken 
from Angelopoulos et al (2011), who have followed the methodology of Conesa et al (2007) 
in constructing effective tax rates for the UK economy.    
   16
4.3 Long-run solutions   
The long-run solutions of the two model economies follow from (11a-k) and (17a-k) 
respectively if we assume that variables do not change and there are no shocks. Notice that 
the computation of the long-run solution is complicated by the fact that the system is “under-
identified” in the sense that there are nine equations and eleven endogenous variables. This 
happens because, in the long run, the two agents’ (i.e. private and public workers’) Euler 
conditions for capital (see equations (11b) and (17b) written in the long run) are reduced to 
one equation only. The same applies to the two Euler conditions for bonds (see equations 
(11c) and (17c) written in the long run). Thus, the model can pin down the total long-run 
stocks of capital and bonds but not their allocations to the two types of agents. To 
circumvent this usual problem, we assume that the allocation of total capital and total bonds 
to the two types of agents is according to their shares in population.
13 Thus, the long-run 
stock of capital, denoted as K , is allocated as 
pp bb KN K N K =+ , and the long-run stock of 
bonds, denoted as B , is allocated as 
pp bb B NB NB =+ .   
Using the parameter and policy values in Table 1, and the allocation rules above, the 
solutions of the two model economies are reported in Table 2a.  
 
 
Table 2a around here 
(solution when public debt is the residual instrument in the long run) 
 
 
  Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2a report respectively the solution of the status quo 
economy in section 2 and the solution of the reformed economy in section 3. Notice that our 
long-run solution for the status quo economy can mimic well most of the averages in the 
actual data. For instance, our long-run solution for the public wage to private wage ratio is 
found to be  / 0.8112
gp ww =  in column 1, which is close to that in the actual data over our 
sample period, 0.8884. We also report that our long-run output shares of consumption, 
capital, etc, are close to their average values in the data.   
We can now proceed to compare the status quo economy to the reformed economy. 
Recall that, in the latter, the same amount of public goods is supplied by cost-minimizing 
private providers. Recall also that the superscript b  denotes those households that are 
                                                           
13 Resorting to some extraneous assumption to get an allocation share to each individual in models with 
different agents and perfect capital markets (or to some portfolio share in models where assets are perfect   17
involved in the production of the public good, either as public employees in the status quo 
economy, or as workers at the cost-minimizing private providers/firms in the reformed 
economy, while the superscript  p  denotes those households that work in private firms 
producing the private good.  
Per capita long-run utility, u , defined as the weighted average of the utility of  p  
households and the utility of b  households where the weights are their shares in population, 
rises as we switch from the status quo to the reformed economy. This is driven by a 
substantial increase in the utility of  p   households, 
p u . By contrast, the utility of b  
households, 
b u , falls as we switch to the reformed economy. The fall in the utility of b  
households is mainly due to lower wages. In particular, the ratio of public to private wages, 
/
g p ww , falls from 0.8112 in column 1 to only 0.3931 in column 2 of Table 2a. Lower labor 
income explains in turn the fall in consumption and hours of work of b  households. It also 
explains why the total labor cost of public good production, as share of output, falls from 
0.1090 in the data (see column 1) to 0.0362 in the reformed economy (see column 2). Since 
this cost is always financed by the government, a more efficient way of delivering the public 
good allows the government to make efficiency savings. In turn, since the residual policy 
instrument is, by assumption, the stock of public debt, these efficiency savings allow the 
government to afford a higher debt burden through the long-run government budget 
constraint. As reported in Table 2a, the endogenously determined output share of public 
debt, / by , rises from 309.57% in column 1 to a very high number in column 2.   
Notice that long-run per capita output,  y , falls as we switch to the reformed 
economy. This seemingly paradoxical result arises simply because we have assumed that it is 
public debt that adjusts to close the government budget. As said above, in this case, 
efficiency savings only allow the government to afford the financing of a much higher debt 
burden. Thus, although we move to a more efficient way of delivering the public good, we 
do not use, by assumption, the resources saved in a way that benefits the supply side of the 
economy. At the same time, the decrease in public wages creates an adverse demand effect 
on output. The combination of those two effects, namely, the absence of supply-side benefits 
and the adverse effect on the demand side, explains the drop in  y , even if we have switched 
to a more efficient way of delivering the public good in column 2.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
substitutes) is usual in the literature (see e.g. Judd, 1985, and Garcia-Milà et al, 2010, in models with different 
agents, and Mendoza and Tesar, 1998, in a two-country model with different assets).    18
To confirm the above, we study two alternative, more interesting, long-run ways of 
public financing. In Table 2b, the residual policy instrument is assumed to be the 
consumption tax rate, while, in Table 2c, the residual policy instrument is the labor tax rate. 
In both cases, the public debt-to-output ratio is now exogenously set at its average value in 
the data, 0.8. As shown in Table 2b, efficiency savings allow the government to afford a 
much lower consumption tax rate. The fall in consumption taxes allows a large increase in 
the consumption of  p  households and this offsets the adverse demand effect coming from 
the fall in consumption of b  households. As our numerical solutions show, one effect almost 
offsets the other so that output remains more or less as in the status quo economy (compare 
columns 1 and 2 in Table 2b). In Table 2c, efficiency savings allow the government to afford 
a much lower labor tax rate. Since labor taxes are particularly distorting (see also e.g. 
Angelopoulos  et al, 2011, for the UK), their reduction stimulates long-run output 
substantially (it rises from 0.7514 in column 1 to 0.7877 in column 2). Thus, we now have 
supply-side benefits that lead to a larger pie (as we show below, this larger pie allows the 
government to afford Pareto improving redistributive policies).  
 
Table 2b around here 
(solution when the consumption tax is the residual instrument in the long run) 
 
 
Table 2c around here 
(solution when the labor tax is the residual instrument in the long run) 
 
 
4.4 Transition dynamics and lifetime utility  
The above referred to the long run. We now compare expected discounted lifetime utility 
under the status quo economy to that under private providers. To do so, we work in two 
steps. In the first step, we check that, when log-linearized around their long-run solutions, 
both model economies in sections 2 and 3 are saddle-path stable. Note that, within each 
regime, transition dynamics arise because of shocks to total factor productivity (these shocks 
are the only source of uncertainty in our model).
14 In the second step, plugging the 
equilibrium time-path solutions into the welfare criterion in (1)-(2) above, we compute 
expected discounted lifetime utility under all regimes. This is done for each type of 
household.    19
Results for expected discounted lifetime utility, under the three different ways of 
long-run public financing, are reported in the last three rows of Tables 2a, 2b and 2c 
respectively. As can be seen, the transition results are qualitatively as the long-run results. 
Namely, in all cases studied, a switch from the status quo economy (see column 1) to an 
economy with private provision/public finance (see column 2) is good for private employees 




We now check the sensitivity of our results to changes in the assumed parameter values and, 
especially, the value of the unknown parameter, 1 θ − , measuring the productivity of public 
employment in the public sector production function, equation (10). We report that all results 
above are robust to parameter values used.  
For instance, keeping everything else as in the baseline parameterization of Table 1, 
we now arbitrarily set 10 . 3 θ −=  and 10 . 7 θ − = . Results for these two new cases are 
reported in Tables 3a-c and 4a-c respectively.  
   
Tables 3a-c around here 
(like Tables 2a-c with 10 . 3 θ − = ) 
 
Tables 4a-c around here 
(like Tables 2a-c with 10 . 7 θ − = ) 
 
4.6 Summary of this section  
In all cases studied, the switch from the status quo economy to an economy with private 
providers increases aggregate welfare at the cost of making public employees worse off. On 
the other hand, the effects of this reform on aggregate output depend on the method of public 
financing; when the efficiency savings, coming from a more efficient way of delivering the 
public good, are translated into reductions in distorting taxes, aggregate output also rises.  
 
5.  Can public providers beat private providers?   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
14 Impulse response functions are available upon request. We also report that our main results do not change if 
we also allow the exogenous policy instruments to be stochastic.     20
So far, strictly speaking, we have been “unfair” to the public sector. In particular, we have 
compared the status quo economy to an economy with private providers, but the presumption 
has been that, in the status quo economy, public production decisions were ad hoc and as in 
the data, while, in the reformed economy, public production decisions were made by cost-
minimizing private firms. Although comparisons of this type are common in the related 
literature on policy reforms (see e.g. Lucas, 1990), one is wondering what would happen 
when we compare the cases in which, not only private providers, but also public 
providers/enterprises minimize their costs, always with the general taxpayer (i.e. the 
government) financing these costs. We turn to this question now.   
 
5.1 Cost-minimizing public providers 
The economy with cost-minimizing public providers is as in section 2 but now, in addition, 
in each period, the public provider/enterprise chooses its two productive inputs, 
g
t G  and 
g
t L , 
or equivalently the associated spending shares, 
g
t s  and 
w
t s , to minimize costs. Using the 
same public sector production function as in (10) above, the cost-minimization problem is: 
 
1 [( ) ( ) ]
gg g g gg
tt t t tt t t Gw L YA G L
θ θ ξ




t w  is the wage rate,  t ξ  is a multiplier measuring the marginal cost of producing the 
public good and 
g
t Y   is the total amount of public goods which is again given by the solution 
of the model in section 2.  













                                                                                                                             (20) 
 
which says that the ratio of public spending on the two inputs should be equal to the ratio of 
their productivities.  
In the new DCE, we have twelve equations, (11a-k) and (20), in twelve variables, 
1 111 0 {,, , , , ,,,,,,}
pb p b p b p b fg w
t t t ttt t t t t t t t C C KKBBu u Y s s ρ
∞
+ +++ = . This is for any feasible policy, 
{
g
t Y  ,
,, ,,









= , and total factor productivity,  0 {} tt A
∞
= . These equilibrium   21
equations are log-linearized around the long run. Solutions of this model economy, under the 
three different ways of long-run public financing, and under the three different values of 
1 θ − , are reported in column 3 in all Tables above, namely Tables 2a-c, 3a-c and 4a-c.  
The general message is that the regime in column 3 is very similar to the status quo 
regime in column 1. Any differences between the results in column 3 and the results in 
column 1 are minor and are driven by differences in 1 θ − .
15 More importantly, the 
comparison of results in columns 1 and 3, on one hand, to those in column 2, on the other 
hand, indicate that private provision/public finance is the best choice in all cases studied.  
 
5.2 Summary of this section 
When we assume that public providers choose inputs in a cost-minimizing way, the solution 
is similar to that when the associated policy variables are exogenously set at their data 
averages. This could mean that in the UK, over 1990-2010, the public sector has exhausted 
its role in terms of aggregate efficiency as a provider of public goods. By contrast, 
contracting out the production of public goods to private providers can lead to important 
efficiency gains.    
 
6.  Pareto improving reforms and transfers  
 
As we have seen, although per capita welfare increases when we move from the status quo 
economy to the economy with public finance, public employees clearly become worse off 
since they lose their role and turn into employees in private firms providing the public good. 
This means that such reforms, although good for the general interest, are unlikely to be 
implemented, especially, when public sector employees, or their trade unions, have a strong 
influence in blocking reforms.  
  The question is whether the society can take advantage of the efficiency savings, 
generated by private provision/public finance, and design a transfer scheme that improves 
                                                           
15 In Tables 2a-c and 3a-c, the welfare of public employees falls as we move from the status quo regime in 
column 1, where public purchases of goods and services, as well as the public wage bill are set as in the data, to 
the regime in column 3, where these choices are made in a cost-minimizing way. This is intuitive. The opposite 
happens in Tables 4a-c, where 
w
t s  and hence the welfare of public employees rise as we move from column 1 
to column 3. This might look paradoxical but it happens simply because of the optimality condition (20). Since 
10 . 7 θ −=  is relatively high (or  0.3 θ =  is relatively low), it is optimal to choose a relatively high 
w
t s  (or a 
relatively low 
g
t s ).     22
the welfare of both types of agents, namely both private and public employees, relative to the 
status quo economy.  
 
6.1 Endogenzing transfers  
We search for a transfer scheme that, in combination with private provision/public finance of 
public goods, makes everybody equally well off. In particular, instead of assuming that 
transfers are exogenously allocated to the two groups according to their population shares, 
we now endogenize this scheme by solving for an allocation of transfers that makes both 
agents equally off in the long run of the reformed economy in section 3.
16  Results are 
reported in column 4 in Tables 2a-c, 3a-c and 4a-c. As can be seen, when we compare this 
economy (in column 4) to the status quo economy (in column 1), there is room for 
substantial welfare gains for both types of agents. This holds in all Tables (2a-c, 3a-c and 4a-
c). This provides an argument for social contracts (see below).      
 
6.2 Summary of this section 
A switch to private provision/public finance, in combination with redistributive government 




We studied a much debated reform of the state - the idea of opening up public services to 
new providers - in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium setup. We showed that 
substantial aggregate gains are possible if the society switches to private provision/public 
finance of public goods. It is remarkable that this happens even when the amount of public 
goods produced, and the number of households employed in the production of public goods, 
remain the same as in the status quo economy. We also showed that one can design 
redistributive schemes that allow everybody, including public employees, to benefit from 
such a switch.  
Our results are another example of the importance of social contracts (see also the 
discussion in Garcia-Milà et al, 2010). In our model, social contracts that terminate the 
                                                           
16 See e.g. Park and Philippopoulos (2003) for other redistributive transfer mechanisms in a dynamic general 
equilibrium model.    23
monopoly of the public sector as a producer of public goods, in combination of transfers that 
compensate those previously employed by the state, can benefit everybody.  
     24
APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: First-order conditions of household  p  in section 2 
The first-order conditions include the budget constraints and:  
() ( 1 ) ( )( 1 )
pc p g l p
tt t t t t eC Y w
ξ µτ ψ τ ++ = −                                                                                (A.1)                   
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Appendix C: Market-clearing conditions in section 2   
In the labor market: 
ff p p
tt tt Ne Ne =                or 
fp
tt ee =                                  
g bb
tt t LN e =                                                                            
In the capital market: 
f fp p b b
tt tt t t NK NK NK =+                                                      
In the bond market: 
pp bb
tt t t t B NB NB =+  
In the dividend market: 
ff p p
tt tt NN π π =             or  
fp
tt π π =     
In the goods market (economy’s resource constraint): 
pp bb p p b b g ff
tt tt t t t t t t t NC NC NI NI G NY +++ + = 
 
Appendix D: Cost minimization of private provider g  in section 3 
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where (D.1c) follows if we use (D.1a)-(D.1b) to get expressions for 
g
t K  and 
g
t e  respectively, 
and use these expressions for 
g
t K  and 
g
t e  in the production function, 























− − ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠⎝⎠












⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
                                                                                                   (D.2b) 
so that the total cost of each firm can be written as:  
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Note that profits are zero for this firm (thanks to CRS). To show this, consider profits:  
1 1 () ( ) 1
1
gg
gg g g g tt t
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so that (thanks to linearity) the first-order condition is:   
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but, if this condition holds, total profits are also zero in each period. 
 
Appendix E: Market-clearing conditions in section 3    
In the labor market: 
pf pp
tt tt Ne Ne =     or  
fp
tt ee =    26
bg bb
tt tt Ne Ne =      or  
g b
tt ee =                  
In the capital market: 
pf bg pp b b
tt tt tt tt NK NK NK NK +=+                                                    
In the bond market: 
pp bb
tt t t t B NB NB =+  
In the goods market (economy’s resource constraint): 
pp bb p p b b pf
tt tt t t t t t t NC NC NI NI NY +++= 
where recall that that the privately produced public good is provided without charge as in 
section 2.  
 
Appendix F: Factor returns in section 3  
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Table 1 








α   Share of capital in private production  0.399 
1 θ −   Share of public employment in public production  0.493* 
k δ   Capital depreciation rate  0.05 
β   Rate of time preference  0.99 
ψ   Public consumption weight in utility  0.1 
µ   Preference parameter on work hours in utility  5 
ξ   Elasticity of work hours in utility  1 
w s   Public wage payments as share of GDP  0.1090 
g s   Public purchases as share of GDP  0.1119 
tr s  
Public transfers as share of GDP  0.2199 
c τ   Tax rate on consumption  0.1852 
k τ   Tax rate on capital income  0.3875 
l τ   Tax rate on labor income  0.2685 
b v   Public employees as share of population  0.1904 
A   Long-run TFP  1 
a ρ   Autoregressive parameter of TFP  0.9 
a σ   Standard deviation of TFP  0.01 
Notes: * We also experiment with  3 . 0 1 = −θ  (see Tables 3a-c) and  7 . 0 1 = −θ  (see Tables 4a-c).   28
Table 2a 
Solution when public debt is the residual public finance instrument  














t b u U β  and 





















p u   - 0.9634  - 0.8174  - 0.9635  - 0.8546 
b u   - 1.0912  - 1.1693  - 1.0916  - 0.8546 
u   - 0.9877  - 0.8844  - 0.9879  - 0.8546 
p c   0.5185 0.5692  0.5184 0.5555 
b c   0.4413 0.3405  0.4411 0.4581 
p e   0.3581 0.3266  0.3581 0.3345 
b e   0.3404 0.2128  0.3404 0.1894 
p g w w /   0.8112 0.3931  0.8107 0.4683 
y   0.7357 0.6710  0.7357 0.6873 






/ cy   0.6848 0.7834  0.6847 0.7812 
/ ky   4.0663 4.3222  4.0663 4.3756 
y b/   3.0957 19.6714  3.0889 19.2809 
w s   0.1090  
(exogenous) 
0.0362 0.1089 0.0375 
g s   0.1119  
(exogenous) 
- 0.1120 - 
p t s
,  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.6476*
tr s  
b t s
,  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.3524*
tr s  
p U   - 96.3480  - 81.8854  - 96.8391  - 85.6252 
b U   - 109.1243  - 117.0656  - 109.5463  - 85.6126 
U   - 98.7806  - 88.5837  - 99.2586  - 85.6228   29
Table 2b 




















p u   - 0.9577  - 0.7469  - 0.9576  -0.8021 
b u   - 1.0909  - 1.2892  - 1.0915  -0.8021 
u   - 0.9830  - 0.8501  - 0.9831  -0.8021 
p c   0.5262 0.6515  0.5263 0.6286 
b c   0.4457 0.3124  0.4454 0.4902 
p e   0.3631 0.3632  0.3631 0.3739 
b e   0.3461 0.2443  0.3460 0.2043 
p g w w /   0.8092 0.3265  0.8084  0.4275 
y   0.7461 0.7462  0.7461 0.7683 






/ cy   0.6848 0.7866  0.6847 0.7839 
/ ky   4.0663 4.2679  4.0663 4.3227 








c τ   0.1513  - 0.0676  0.1513  - 0.0618 
w s   0.1090  
(exogenous) 
0.0310 0.1089  0.0330 
g s   0.1119  
(exogenous) 
- 0.1119  - 
p t s
,  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.6362*
tr s  
b t s
,  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.3638*
tr s  
p U   - 95.7719  - 74.8024  - 96.2548  - 80.3566 
b U   - 109.0989  - 129.0222  - 109.5306  - 80.3466 
U   - 98.3094  - 85.1258  - 98.7825  - 80.3547 
Notes: See the notes of Table 2a.   30
Table 2c 




















p u   - 0.9548  - 0.7136  - 0.9549  -0.7812 
b u   - 1.0910  - 1.4100  - 1.0915  -0.7812 
u   - 0.9808  - 0.8462  - 0.9809  -0.7812 
p c   0.5302 0.7000  0.5302 0.6703 
b c   0.4479 0.2845  0.4477 0.5053 
p e   0.3657 0.3834  0.3657 0.3961 
b e   0.3490 0.2676  0.3489 0.2129 
p g w w /   0.8082 0.2881  0.8076 0.4066 
y   0.7514 0.7877  0.7514 0.8137 






/ cy   0.6848 0.7882  0.6847 0.7851 
/ ky   4.0663 4.2362  4.0663 4.2984 








l τ   0.2358 -  0.0540  0.2359 -0.00430 
w s   0.1090  
(exogenous) 
0.0284 0.1089  0.0309 
g s   0.1119  
(exogenous) 
- 0.1120  - 
p t s
,  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.5539*
tr s  
b t s
,  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.4461*
tr s  
p U   - 95.4891  - 71.4572  - 95.9885  - 78.2488 
b U   - 109.1058  - 141.0739  - 109.5255  - 78.2413 
U   - 98.0817  - 84.7122  - 98.5660  - 78.2474 
Notes: See the notes of Table 2a. 
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Table 3a 
Solution when public debt is the residual public finance instrument 
 















t b u U β  and 




















p u   -0.9629 -0.8191  -0.9379  -0.8559 
b u   -1.0905 -1.1643  -1.3081  -0.8559 
u   -0.9872 -0.8848  -1.0084  -0.8559 
p c   0.5183 0.5682  0.5264  0.5547 
b c   0.4412 0.3438  0.3196  0.4594 
p e   0.3580 0.3269  0.3525  0.3348 
b e   0.3403 0.2178  0.2764  0.1944 
p g w w /   0.8113 0.4065  0.4804  0.4822 
y   0.7354 0.6717  0.7242  0.6878 






/ cy   0.6848 0.7823  0.6725  0.7800 
/ ky   4.0663 4.3538  4.0663  4.3993 
y b/   3.0957 19.3737  5.6874  19.5990 
w s   0.1090  
(exogenous) 
0.0383 0.0532  0.0396 
g s   0.1119  
(exogenous) 
- 0.1242  - 
p t s
,  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.6507*
tr s  
b t s
,  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.3493*
tr s  
p U   -96.2942 -82.0878  -94.3049  -85.7895 
b U   -109.0579 -116.6119  -131.3597  -85.7964 
U   -98.7244 -88.6612  -101.3601 -85.7908   32
Table 3b 




















p u   -0.9571 -0.7494  -0.9163  -0.8040 
b u   -1.0903 -1.2795  -1.3348  -0.8040 
u   -0.9825 -0.8504  -0.9960  -0.8040 
p c   0.5261 0.6493  0.5484  0.6266 
b c   0.4456 0.3171  0.3161  0.4915 
p e   0.3630 0.3630  0.3631  0.3736 
b e   0.3459      0.2491  0.2881  0.2093 
p g w w /   0.8093 0.3392  0.4621  0.4409 
y   0.7459 0.7459  0.7461  0.7676 






/ cy   0.6848 0.7857  0.6758  0.7828 
/ ky   4.0663 4.2854  4.0663  4.3431 








c τ   0.1513 -0.0646  0.1048  -0.0585 
w s   0.1090  
(exogenous) 
0.0329 0.0518  0.0349 
g s   0.1119  
(exogenous) 
- 0.1209  - 
p t s
,  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.6391*
tr s  
b t s
,  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.3609*
tr s  
p U   -95.7180 -75.0874  -92.1387  -80.5827 
b U   -109.0320 -128.0927  -134.0285  -80.5823 
U   -98.2530 -85.1796  -100.1145 -80.5826 
Notes: See the notes of Table 3a.   33
Table 3c 




















p u   -0.9543 -0.7164  -0.9030  -0.7844 
b u   -1.0903 -1.3954  -1.3560  -0.7844 
u   -0.9802 -0.8457  -0.9892  -0.7844 
p c   0.5301 0.6972  0.5628  0.6672 
b c   0.4478 0.2903  0.3129  0.5109 
p e   0.3656 0.3831  0.3699  0.3957 
b e   0.3489 0.2721  0.2959  0.2172 
p g w w /   0.8082 0.3004  0.4497  0.4218 
y   0.7512 0.7870  0.7599  0.8130 






/ cy   0.6848 0.7874  0.6780  0.7841 
/ ky   4.0663 4.2516  4.0663  4.3182 








l τ   0.2358 -0.0494  0.1799  -0.0378 
w s   0.1090  
(exogenous) 
0.0302 0.0509  0.0327 
g s   0.1119  
(exogenous) 
- 0.1187  - 
p t s
,  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.5544*
tr s  
b t s
,  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.4456*
tr s  
p U   -95.4351 -71.7637  -90.7988  -78.6098 
b U   -109.0386 -139.6605  -136.1383  -77.6047 
U   -98.0252 -84.6913  -99.4314  -78.4184 
Notes: See the notes of Table 3a.   34
Table 4a 
Solution when public debt is the residual public finance instrument 















t b u U β  and 





















p u   -0.9640 -0.8158  -0.9939  -0.8534 
b u   -1.0919 -1.1745  -0.8011  -0.8534 
u   -0.9883 -0.8841  -0.9571  -0.8534 
p c   0.5186 0.5701  0.5092  0.5563 
b c   0.4415 0.3371  0.6406  0.4567 
p e   0.3582 0.3262  0.3647  0.3343 
b e   0.3405 0.2075  0.3829  0.1842 
p g w w /   0.8112 0.3792  1.3170  0.4537 
y   0.7359 0.6702  0.7493  0.6867 






/ cy   0.6848 0.7845  0.7129  0.7824 
/ ky   4.0663 4.3109  4.0663  4.3518 
y b/   3.0957 19.9708  0.1392  19.5990 
w s   0.1090  
(exogenous) 
0.0341 0.1954  0.0353 
g s   0.1119  
(exogenous) 
- 0.0838  - 
p t s
,  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.6445*
tr s  
b t s
,  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.3555*
tr s  
p U   -96.4031 -81.6855  -99.8450  -85.4613 
b U   -109.1922 -117.5351 -80.1622  -85.4458 
U   -98.8382 -88.5112  -96.0974  -85.4584   35
 
Table 4b 




















p u   -0.9582 -0.7443  -1.0089  -0.8002 
b u   -1.0916 -1.2993  -0.7869  -0.8002 
u   -0.9836 -0.8500  -0.9666  -0.8002 
p c   0.5264 0.6537  0.4999  0.6305 
b c   0.4459      0.3076  0.6512  0.4889 
p e   0.3633 0.3633  0.3631  0.3743 
b e   0.3462 0.2392  0.3841  0.1990 
p g w w /   0.8092 0.3135  1.3733  0.4135 
y   0.7463 0.7465  0.7461  0.7690 






/ cy   0.6848 0.7875  0.7087  0.7849 
/ ky   4.0663 4.2507  4.0663  4.3024 








c τ   0.1513 -0.0706  0.2119  -0.0651 
w s   0.1090  
(exogenous) 
0.0292 0.2053  0.0311 
g s   0.1119  
(exogenous) 
- 0.0880  - 
p t s
,  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.6333*
tr s  
b t s
,  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.3667*
tr s  
p U   -95.8271 -74.5196  -101.3694 -80.1331 
b U   -109.1674 -129.9837 -78.7532  -80.1098 
U   -98.3671 -85.0800  -97.0633  -80.1287 
Notes: See the notes of Table 4a. 
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Table 4c 




















p u   -0.9554 -0.7107  -1.0213  -0.7791 
b u   -1.0917 -1.4255  -0.7813  -0.7791 
u   -0.9813 -0.8468  -0.9756  -0.7791 
p c   0.5304 0.7029  0.4909  0.6729 
b c   0.4481 0.2785  0.6541  0.5038 
p e   0.3659 0.3838  0.3601  0.3967 
b e   0.3491 0.2626  0.3835  0.2074 
p g w w /   0.8081 0.2752  1.4136  0.3927 
y   0.7517 0.7885    0.8151 






/ cy   0.6848 0.7890  0.7055  0.7860 
/ ky   4.0663 4.2206  4.0663  4.2793 








l τ   0.2358 -0.0484  0.3031  -0.0482 
w s   0.1090  
(exogenous) 
0.0266 0.2128  0.0290 
g s   0.1119  
(exogenous) 
- 0.0912  - 
p t s
,  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.8096*
tr s  0.5485*
tr s  
b t s
,  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.1904*
tr s  0.4515*
tr s  
p U   -95.5443 -71.1438  -102.6201 -78.0124 
b U   -109.1746 -142.5787 -78.1981  -77.9893 
U   -98.1395 -84.7450  -97.9702  -78.0080 
Notes: See the notes of Table 4a. 
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